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In the run up to the 2014 European Parliament (EP) election, pundits, 
politicians and scholars suggested that the standard theory of EP elections as 
mid-term contests in which voters cast their votes primarily to punish governing 
parties should be amended. The first aspect considered was an increased 
legitimacy and credibility of the EP, given the changed institutional dynamics at 
the European level. As observed by Corbett, “the EP is in fact now 
incontournable in EU decision-taking […] This is not a ‘rubber stamp’ 
Parliament with an acquiescent ‘governing majority’ whose members 
automatically vote for a proposal by ‘their’ government, as is so often the case 
in national parliaments“1. Secondly, in line with the provision of the Lisbon 
treaty (art. 17(7) TEU)2 and the EP resolution of 22 November 2012, for the 
first time, European political parties were asked to nominate candidates for the 
Presidency of the Commission, with the explicit aim of “reinforcing the 
political legitimacy of both Parliament and the Commission by connecting their 
respective elections more directly to the choice of the voters”3. This strategic 
investment was supposed to “personalise and Europeanise the elections, raise 
the salience and stakes of the EP vote, and thus reverse the familiar pattern of 
low turnouts”4. Last but not least, among the potential consequences of Europe's 
                                                 
1
 Richard Corbett, “European Elections are Second-Order Elections: Is Receive Wisdom 
Changing?”,Journal of Common Market Studies, online version first, 2014, p. 1. 
2
  “Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union – Consolidated version of the Treaty on European 
Union – Protocols – Declarations Annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental 
Conference which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, Signed on 13 December 2007”, Official 
Journal C 326, 26 October 2012 P. 0001 – 0390, available at: http://eurlex.europa.eu 
/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012M/TXT&from=EN, last accessed 20 
September 2014. 
3
 European Parliament resolution of 22 November 2012 on the elections to the European 
Parliament in 2014 (2012/2829(RSP)), available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P7-TA-2012-462, last accessed 29 
September 2014. 
4
 Corina Stratulat, Janis A. Emmanouilidis, “The European Parliament Elections 2014 
Watershed or, Again, Washed Out?”, European Policy Centre Discussion Papers, 
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recent economic and financial crisis, EU issues were supposed to be become 
more relevant as voting choices, with direct impact not only on the structure of 
national party competition, but also on party competition in the EP5. 
Despite these optimistic premises, in the aftermath of the May 2014 
elections, the vulnerability of the European project was once again epitomized 
not only by the average turnout (below the 2009 EU-27 level of 43%, with a 
decrease of 0.46%)6, but also by the number of seats for extremist platforms 
both on the far right and far left. 
Based on the above, this paper aims to look closely at the empirical 
evidence from the Italian case. As one of the six founding members of the 
European Economic Community, the contemporary history of Italy has 
regularly intersected with the history of the European arena. Significantly, as 
early as 1941, Altiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi described their federalist 
projects in a symbolic Manifesto. A decade after the end of WWII, in Messina, 
in 1995, and in Venice one year later, decisive inputs to the European project 
were brought to the political agenda in view of the signature in Rome of the two 
treaties establishing the EEC and the European Atomic Energy Community. 
Significant Italian contributions were further linked to the foundation of 
European agricultural policy in 1962, as well as to the setting-up of the 
Regional Development Fund (ERDF) in 1975. By the beginning of the 1980s, 
the so-called Spinelli Plan was to be adopted in the EP, providing a solid basis 
for EEC institutional reform under the Single European Act (1986), and the 
Treaty of Maastricht (1992). Note also that the careers of major Italian political 
and technical figures such as Romano Prodi (president of the European 
Commission and former prime-minister from 1996-1998, and from 2006-2008), 
Mario Monti (European commissioner and future prime-minister from 2011-
2013), Mario Draghi (president of the European Central Bank) and Federica 
Mogherini (new high representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy) have marked the Brussels’ scene. Last but not least, for 
almost four decades, Italy was renowned as a rather Euro-enthusiastic country, 
though an emerging decrease in public support for European integration has 
spread in parallel with a deep disaffection with politics and increasingly visible 
Euroscepticist and anti-establishment parties and movements such as the 
Northern League (LN) or the Five Star Movement (M5S). 
                                                                                                                       
September 2013, available at: http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub_3699_ep_ 
elections_2014.pdfd, last accessed 20 September 2014. 
5
 Lorenzo De Sio, Vincenzo Emanuele, Nicola Maggini, “Introduction”, in Idem (eds.), The 
European Parliament Elections of 2014, CISE, Roma, 2014, available at: 
http://cise.luiss.it/cise/2014/07/29/the-european-parliament-elections-of-2014-the-e-book/, 
last accessed 29 September 2014. 
6
 See on this topic “The European Parliament. Elected, Yet Strangely Unaccountable”, The 
Economist, 17 May 2014, available at: http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/ 
21602200-european-elections-will-neither-lend-new-credibility-european-parliament-nor-
give, last accessed 29 September 2014. 
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Given the above, this article aims to analyze how the EU affected party 
politics in the 2014 elections for the European Parliament, particularly the 
discourse used by parties and the positions they adopted. After a brief 
discussion of the existing literature on the EU elections, the remainder of this 
article is divided into three sections. First, I look at the general features of party 
politics in Italy. Second, I delineate the main actors involved in the May 2014 
elections by highlighting some of the similarities and differences in relation to 
the politicization of the EU. Finally, I seek to conceptualize the role of the EU 
in party politics in Italy, and suggest lines for future research. 
 
 
EUROPEAN ELECTIONS: NATIONAL AFFAIRS? 
 
When dealing with the topic of the elections for the EP a recurrent, 
though not consensual7, element in the literature refers to European elections as 
“additional national second-order elections” (Nebenwahlen), which are not only 
determined more by domestic political cleavages than by European issues, but 
also tend to be less important than the major electoral stake: the national 
elections8. Accordingly, the EP is depicted as “mid-term contests in the battle to 
win national government office, and so voters primarily use these elections to 
punish governing parties”9. In other words, what influences the electorate’s 
decisions is mainly the dynamics of national politics. In direct consequence, this 
model tends to interpret voting behavior in EP elections in relation to three 
constant elements. EP elections tend to: 
(1) be characterized by a rather low turnout compared with national 
competitions because there is “less at stake”;  
(2) provide major opportunities for smaller parties to be represented, 
given that citizens have the opportunity to express a sincere vote rather than a 
strategic one, and hence to cast their vote for parties closer to their preferences, 
and that have smaller or no chances of forming a (national) government. Hence 
large parties tend to perform worse, whether in government or in opposition, 
while smaller parties outperform; 
(3) be a test for governing parties that generally perform worse, losing 
votes in favor of the opposition. 
In all, from the supply level, the standard theory of the EP considers that 
parties’ and politicians’ main concern is to secure national government offices, 
                                                 
7
 Nick Clark, Robert Rohrschneider, “Second-Order Elections Versus First Order Thinking: 
How Voters Perceive the Representation Process in a Multi-Layered System of 
Governance”, Journal of European Integration, vol. 31, no. 5, 2009, pp. 645-664. 
8
 Karlheinz Reif, Hermann Schmitt, “Nine Second-Order National Elections. A Conceptual 
Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results”, European Journal for 
Political Research, vol. 8, no. 1, 1980, p. 3. 
9
 Simon Hix, Michael Marsh, “Punishment or Protest? Understanding European Parliament 
Elections”, The Journal of Politics, vol. 69, no. 2, 2007, p. 495. 
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and as such tend to invest fewer resources in EP campaigns. On the demand 
side, the assumption is that there are consequently fewer incentives for voters 
less familiar with EU issues and politicians to take part in these contests.10In 
brief, “voters cast their votes not only as a result of conditions present within 
the specific context of the second-order arena, but also on the basis of factors in 
the main political arena of the nation”11, both in terms of the domestic economic 
situation and, in general, government performance or in relation to other issues 
that characterize the domestic competition among parties12. The EP elections are 
thus secondary in relation not only to the main contest arena – elections for the 
makeup of national governments – but also to the national dimension of the 
topics of debates13. 
These general trends are conditioned by variability in timing: in those 
cases in which EP elections are organized immediately after a national election, 
though turnout might be lower, the governing formula should be able to control 
the wave of satisfaction after the recently organized elections. On the contrary, 
if EP elections are organized before the upcoming national election, the level of 
mobilization of both supply and demand will be higher14. Over the last decade, 
this classic view of European elections has been partially amended. Kousser, for 
example, finds evidence in favor of an increasing number of defectors as the 
time between domestic and EP contests grows15. Varying evidence has been 
found in relation to the standard assumption according to which governing 
parties lose and opposition parties gain16. Hix and Marsh’s analysis of the 2009 
European elections confirmed the early 1980’s framework of analysis within 
contests monopolized more by domestic issues and government performance 
than EU topics, and the positions of the political groups in the EP or the 
performance of individual MEPs17, though important nuances were suggested in 
relation to the shared bad performance of socialist parties, whether in 
government or opposition. The two scholars suggest a possible reassessment of 
the classic assumption according to which “a genuinely ‘European’ election 
                                                 
10
 Ibidem, p. 496. 
11
 Karlheinz Reif, Hermann Schmitt, “Nine Second-Order National Elections…cit.”, p. 9. 
12
 Similar conclusions are provided, among others, by scholars such as Michael Marsh, 
“Testing the Second-Order Election Model after Four European Elections”, British 
Journal of Political Science, vol. 284, 1998, pp. 591-607 or Simon Hix, Michael Marsh, 
“Punishment or Protest?...cit”. 
13
 Simon Hix, Michael Marsh, “Punishment or Protest?...cit.”, p. 496. 
14
 Karlheinz Reif, “National Election Cycles and European Elections, 1979 and 1984”, 
Electoral Studies, vol. 3, no. 3, 1984, pp. 244-255. 
15
 Thaddeus Kousser, “Retrospective Voting and Strategic Behavior in European Parliament 
Elections”, Electoral Studies, vol. 23, no. 1, 2004, pp. 1-21. 
16
 Federico Ferrara, J. Timo Weishaupt, “Get Your Act Together: Party Performance in European 
Parliament Elections”, European Union Politics, vol. 5, no. 3, 2004, pp. 283-306. 
17
 Simon Hix, Michael Marsh, “Second-Order Effects Plus Pan-European Political Swings: 
An Analysis of European Parliament Elections Across Time”, Electoral Studies, vol. 30, 
no. 1, 2011, pp. 4-15. 
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might not in fact be an election where citizens are motivated by their attitudes 
towards the European Union […] but rather a contest where across Europe 
citizens respond to current policy concerns in similar ways”18. The same 
scholars, in a 2007 research, also observe that “there is some evidence to 
suggest that parties’ positions towards the EU influence which parties gain or 
lose votes in these elections”19. Similar nuances were advanced in a study by 
Hobolt, Spoon and Tilley20, pointing toward rather complex empirical evidence 
and divergent explanations. In particular, the three scholars suggested an 
alternative explanation to the second-order election framework, and argued 
instead that voters tend to defect because parties in government tend to be more 
pro-European, while the campaigns express Eurosceptic sentiments. For 
scholars like de Vries and Tillman21, there is increased evidence of the 
relevance of European issues for understanding the parties’ results in EP 
elections; it is mainly in the context of the post-communist countries that the 
EU issue seems to be more salient.  
In opposition to this standard framework, there are fewer scholars voicing 
in favor of a rather vague “Europe matters” camp. In this area, Corbett, for 
example, suggests that the EU does matter to the electorate. While agreeing that 
turnout for European elections has drastically declined over a thirty-year period, 
Corbett suggests that this decline is smaller than the figures registered in sixteen 
Member States for national elections over a similar period. Additionally, the 
influence of European issues on party competition has increased, in particular 
during the current economic crisis, and debate over immigration policies22. In 
parallel, within a post-functionalist frame, scholars like Hooghe and Marks 
posit that the post-Maastricht European arena has become the object of 
increased politicization at a national level. In other words, the EU is no longer 
seen as an exclusive domain of political elites, but as a rather controversial issue 
debated in the electoral competitions and in a wider arena of protest23. The EU 
seems increasingly to be a topic of political conflict24;this line of research 
                                                 
18
 Ibidem, pp. 11-12. 
19
 Simon Hix, Michael Marsh, “Punishment or Protest?...cit.”, p. 495. 
20
 Sara B. Hobolt, Jae-Jae Spoon, James Tilley, “A Vote Against Europe? Explaining 
Defection at the 1999 and 2004 European Parliament Elections”, British Journal of 
Political Science, vol. 39, 2008, pp. 93-115. 
21
 Catherine E. de Vries, Erik R Tillman, “European Union Issue Voting in East and West 
Europe: The Role of Political Context”, Comparative European Politics, vol. 9, 2011, 
pp.1-17 
22
 Richard Corbett, “European Elections are Second-Order Elections…cit.”, pp. 1-2. 
23
 Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, “A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From 
Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus”, British Journal of Politic Science, vol. 39, 
no. 1, 2009, pp. 1-23. 
24
 Catherine de Vries, Wouter van der Brug, Marcel van Egmond, Cees van der Eijk, 
“Individual and Contextual Variation in EU Issue Voting: The Role of Political 
Information”, Electoral Studies, vol. 30, no. 1, 2011, pp. 16-28. 
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indirectly challenges the view that EP elections are primarily national rather 
than European contests. 
Thirty-five years after the first direct election of the EP, the literature 
tended to point towards a rather complex frame of understanding of voters’ 
choices in EP elections. On the one hand, there is evidence supporting the idea 
that EU issues are more frequently raised by political actors in public debates in 
parallel with an expansion of the (non)political players involved in these public 
debates. On the other hand, there is clear proof that it is necessary to 
differentiate this process across countries according to their different national 
histories25. Similarly, an institutional focus underscores increased EP 
competencies, in particular in relation to the power over the election of the 
president of the EU Commission. On the other side, empirical evidence in terms 
of electoral behavior still confirms the previously observed features: EU issues 
have a rather weak effect compared with other electoral determinants (in 
particular left/right positions or the perceptions of economic benefit and social 
identity)26, the prevalent dimension of interpreting voter choice seems to remain 
the voters’ opportunity to mark their satisfaction/dissatisfaction with the 
incumbent national government27. This converges with the recent analysis by 
Bartkowska and Tiemann: the two scholars point out the fact that specific 
economic policies are quite vaguely defined, and voters have difficulties not 
only in attributing responsibility at the national and EU level, but also in 
evaluating alternative programs28. 
 
 
ELECTIONS UNDER THREAT OF POLITICAL  
AND ECONOMIC CRISIS 
 
In order to introduce the topic of the May 2014 elections for the EP in 
Italy, several introductory elements are needed. First there are the features of the 
party politics in Italy. Among the causes for the breakdown of the First 
Republic29, scholars such as Calise have pointed to the crisis of the parties, 
which had been the main pillars of the overall political system (within 
                                                 
25
 Swen Hutter,Edgar Grande, “Politicizing Europe in the National Electoral Arena: A 
Comparative Analysis of Five West European Countries, 1970–2010”,Journal of 
Common Market Studies, vol. 32, n. 5, 2014, pp. 1002- 1018. 
26
 Catherine de Vries, Wouter van der Brug, Marcel van Egmond, Cees van der Eijk, 
“Individual and Contextual Variation in EU Issue Voting:…cit.”. 
27
 Monika Bartkowska, Guido Tiemann, “The Impact of Economic Perceptions on Voting 
Behaviour in European Parliamentary Elections”, The Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 2014 , first published online, p. 1. 
28
 Ibidem. 
29
 During the period from 1948 to 1993. 
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Parliament, but also within the state machinery) since the late 1940s30. While 
the First Republic’s powerful Italian parties failed to assure their survival, and 
disintegrated, the political landscape of the Second Republic31 has been 
characterized by a tense and highly polarized climate in which “a collection of 
fragile, fluctuating, litigious associations of ambitious leaders proliferated”32. In 
parallel, after the 1993 abolition of the proportional electoral system of the First 
Republic, and the adoption of a mixed system, a bonus-adjusted proportional 
electoral system was implemented in 2005. Fruits of strategic electoral 
engineering, both reforms “contributed to the (re)shaping not so much of Italian 
parties and the party system, but of the electoral and the governing coalitions”33. 
Hence, as noted by Valbruzzi, “extreme fluidity and personalization are the key-
words for the correct understanding of the Italian second party system”34 within 
a party landscape dominated by two unstable and fragmented coalitions (center-
right vs. center-left) that regularly alternate in power, with changing names and 
configurations of partners35. 
Beyond these aspects, there are also the avatars of what Bull and Newell 
refer to as the unsolved debate over fundamental institutional reform36. 
Considering the contentious character of the debated institutional reforms, 
together with the personalization of politics37, it looked as if Italy’s Second 
Republic was somehow lost in transition38. Finally, an understanding of current 
Italian party politics has to take into account the consequences of a pervasive 
and financial and sovereign debt crisis since 2008. 
It makes sense to consider that Italy has been living under a permanent 
electoral campaign since the political stalemate that characterized the last 
months of Berlusconi’s 4th Cabinet (2008-2011). Moreover, the Italian political 
and economic crisis put the entire EU under siege, given that Berlusconi’s 
resignation occurred several days after the fall of Greek Prime-Minister 
Papandreou, and in a context of similar economic emergency. Since 2011, Italy 
                                                 
30
 Mauro Calise, “Into the Third Republic.Parties without Presidents and Presidents without 
Parties”, Studia Politica. Romanian Journal of Political Science, vol. XIII, n. 4, 2013, p. 711 
31
 The period after 1993. 
32
 Gianfranco Pasquino, “Democracy at Stake”, Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science 
Review, vol. XIII, no. 4, 2013, p. 611. 
33
 Ibidem, p. 608. 
34
 Marco Valbruzzi, “Not a Normal Country: Italy and its Party System”, Studia Politica. 
Romanian Political Science Review, vol. XIII, no. 4, 2013, p. 626. 
35
 Ibidem. 
36
 Martin J. Bull, James L. Newell, ”Still the Anomalous Democracy? Politics and 
Institutions in Italy”, Government and Opposition, vol. 44, no. 1, 2009, pp. 42-67. 
37
 Mauro Calise, Il partito personale. I due corpi del leader, Laterza, Roma & Bari, 2010. 
38
 Sergio Martini, Mario Quaranta, ”An Unresponsive Democracy? Explaining the 
Dynamics of Italian Political Discontent: 1973-2012”, Paper SISP 2013, p. 15, available 
at: http://www.sisp.it/files/papers/2013/sergio-martini-e-mario-quaranta-1548.pdf, last 
accessed 20 September 2014. 
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has complied with austerity measures in three consecutive cabinets, which 
stimulated not only the rise of wide social protests, but also anti-establishment 
movements such as the M5S. In this context, the lack of a clear winner in the 
2013 legislative elections led to complex negotiations for the formation of a 
government. The political deadlock fed by the results of the February 2013 
general elections seemed solved for a while by the compromise solution of 
Enrico Letta’s oversized majority-cabinet (initially including Berlusconi’s PDL 
and then its splinter, the New Center Right [NCD]). Still, after less than a year 
in office, the PD prime-minister had been shoved out of power by his own party 
and the newly elected party secretary, Matteo Renzi, sworn in as prime-
minister, with a government program based on rapid economic and institutional 
reform (including electoral and constitutional reform) in February 2014. Renzi’s 
cabinet was inaugurated with direct emphasis on the EU, with Renzi calling 
Italy's presidency of the EU in the second half of 2014 “a gigantic opportunity”. 
Thus the 2014 elections for the EP were organized by a newly installed 
cabinet with a rather shaky parliamentary majority under the constant challenge 
of the anti-establishment M5S, but also of Berlusconi’s evergreen center-right Forza 
Italia. Still, from the very beginning, the electoral campaign was portrayed as a 
two-party political race, with the center-left PD in poll position, followed closely by 
Beppe Grillo’s M5S, while Berlusconi’s Forza Italia came at below 20%39. 
European elections were seen as the canvas on which national 
motivations were dissolved, given that the elections for the EP were rapidly 
translated into a test for the credibility of the new prime-minister, whose 
legitimacy was granted by the open primary elections organized by the PD in 
December 201340. The EP elections were thus a surrogate of national elections, 
in line with PM Renzi’s quest for legitimacy (n.b. ‒ the turnout was a major 
issue, and this explains the PD’s interest in encouraging people to vote 
                                                 
39
 Part of the explanations behind this rather meager result is linked to the fact that the party 
leader, Silvio Berlusconi, was now a convicted of felonies by the Milan Court of Appeals, 
which sentenced the former PM to a two-year ban from public office. Although involved 
in a truculent electoral campaign, Berlusconi could not stand for office or vote. See 
Carlo Ungaro, “Hubris and Nemesis: The Nine Lives of Mr Berlusconi”, 
openDemocracy, 6 May 2014, available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-
make-it/carlo-ungaro/hubris-and-nemesis-nine-lives-of-mr-berlusconi, last accessed 20 
September 2014. 
40
 Matteo Renzi won the selection for the party leadership (open not only to party members, 
but also to ordinary voters – a 2.814.881 turnout) with 67.6 percent of the vote, versus 
18.2 percent and 14.2 percent, respectively, for his two rivals, Gianni Cuperlo and 
Giuseppe Civati. Renzi challenged the party leadership from his position as mayor of 
Florence on the basis of a catchy metaphor ‒il rottamatore (the scrapman) – which 
translated as his main objective of inducing a renewal of the PD through a generational 
turnover. For more details see Gianfranco Pasquino, Fulvio Venturino (eds.), IlPartito 
Democratico secondo Matteo, Bononia University Press, Bologna, 2014. 
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strategically for the government)41. The election campaign echoed the previous 
2013 legislative campaign, with constant references to the EU’s role in 
regulating national economies. While the 2006 and 2008 legislative elections 
had very little to do with Europe, Europe was a major topic of debate in the 
2013 general elections: the fil rouge was the different positions parties adopted 
on the fiscal austerity line endorsed by the EU, as well as by the Eurosceptical 
positions embraced by the Lega Nord and M5S, with recurrent emphasis on a 
referendum on Italy’s Euro membership. In the 2014 European elections, the 
Lega Nord and M5S maintained a critical view on the EU in relation to both 
tougher anti-immigration policies and a critical assessment of Italy’s Euro 
membership. Similar positions were endorsed by a small right party, Brothers of 
Italy (FdI), as well. Note that the parties that endorsed the Tsipras List (The 
Other Europe) developed a campaign based on a radical critique of the EU-
imposed austerity measures. The EU-politically-correct PD focused its 
campaign on the need for reforms, with catchy objectives eventually endorsed in 
the program of the Italian Presidency of the Council, such as a review of competition 
policy to favor EU industries, and a strategy for youth employment (Table 1). 
 
Table 1 
Main Themes of the Most Recent Three Parliamentary Elections in Italy42 
 
Election 
Year 
Main themes Mention of European themes 
2006 Taxation; unemployment; immigration; 
Berlusconi 
Not salient 
2008 Economy; public spending; bankruptcy of 
Alitalia; immigration 
Not salient 
2013 Financial & economic crisis; taxes and fiscal 
pressure; government instability; corruption 
& justice system reform; institutional reform 
& electoral reform 
The fiscal austerity policy 
advocated by the EU; 
referendum on Italy’s Euro 
membership 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
41
 On this issue see Gianfranco Pasquino, Marco Valbruzzi, “Il Partito democratico: Renzi 
sta sereno?”,in Marco Valbruzzi, Rinaldo Vignati (eds.), L’Italia e l’Europa al bivio delle 
riforme. Le elezioni europee e amministrative del 25 maggio 2014, Istituto Carlo 
Cattaneo, Bologna, 2014 pp. 115-117. 
42
 Sources: Tim Haughton, “Money, Margins and the Motors of Politics: The EU and the 
Development of Party Politics in Central and Eastern Europe”, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, vol. 52, n. 1, p. 77 and Giorgia Bulli, “Electoral Campaigning in the 
Italian 2013 Elections. Innovation and Tradition”, Studia Politica. Romanian Political 
Science Review, vol. XIII, n. 4, 2013, pp. 659-674. 
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OLD AND NEW FACES IN THE EP ELECTIONS 
IN ITALY 
 
2014 European elections were held fifteen months after the national 
election, in a rather peculiar context. The rhetoric was quite similar – the fiscal 
austerity and the economic reforms mandated by the EU – though the players 
changed, at least the principal ones. 
First, there was young Prime-Minister Renzi instead of middle-aged 
former PD Secretary Pierluigi Bersani. Silvio Berlusconi’s problems with the 
judiciary kept him from a total immersion in the electoral campaign, while 
Forza Italia was weakened by a growing rowing number of defections. Leading 
figures left the party in November 2013 in an attempt to save Letta’s cabinet 
and, under the leadership of Angelino Alfano, created New Center Right 
(NCD). Meanwhile, the Lega Nord maintained unchanged positions on the cap 
on Northern regionalism, and tough stances on immigration, but distanced itself 
from founding-leader Umberto Bossi, who was involved in a major corruption 
scandal. Roberto Maroni temporarily took over the party leadership until the 
party primaries, organized in December 2013, when Matteo Salvini succeeded 
in defeating Bossi (with 82% of the votes). Immediately after his election, the 
young leader, Salvini, called for stronger anti-immigration stances, and 
supported closer ties to parties such as the Front National. The M5S remained 
stable, with constant emphasis on the need for renewal and revitalization of 
democracy voiced by former comedian Beppe Grillo. 
At this point, parties involved in the elections entered the campaign for 
the EP with quite different motivations. In the case of Renzi, Alfano, and 
Salvini, parties invested in this competition in order to reinforce the 
credibility/legitimacy of their new leadership. In particular, the leader of the 
government, Renzi, invested in the campaign with the aim of obtaining a higher 
share of the vote than the previous party secretary had in the 2013 national 
election, but also of containing the forecasted “populist tide” across Europe on 
both extremes. Last but not least there was an element of “European” prestige 
for the prime-minister, who would take over the six-month rotating presidency 
of the Council of the EU after the May 2014 elections, with a political agenda 
particularly important for Italy: the stimulation of economic growth, and the 
struggle against unemployment. 
The effect of the timing of the European election in relation to the most 
recent electoral cycles was ex ante depicted as mixed. According to the 
literature, the number of defectors from the governing party/coalition increases 
in parallel with the time period between domestic and EP contests. The EP 
elections were organized in a peculiar context: fifteen months after the most 
recent national elections but only three months after the installation of the new 
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cabinet. The Letta government’s economic results were rather poor, while 
Renzi’s agenda was full of ambitious projects, with no concrete results 
available. There were numerous open questions: Was the popularity of the new 
prime-minister able to shape voting behavior in European elections? Whose 
government performance would voters evaluate, Letta’s or Renzi’s? Was the 
government party in an advantageous position, with elections held fifteen 
months after the most recent general elections? 
Traditionally, EP elections tend to penalize large parties (whether in 
government or in opposition) while small parties do much better relative to their 
performance in the national election immediately prior to each European 
election. On paper, the 2014 EP elections were supposed to be a window of 
opportunity for new leaderships like Alfano’s and Salvini’s and their smaller 
parties. For Grillo’s movement, the EP elections were seen as a new opportunity 
to voice discontent over the establishment, and to employ once again an online 
mode for selection of 73 candidates43. The M5S was expected to valorize its 
position as the opposition party, though from a rather difficult position of auto-
ostracism, i.e., the constant refusal of any form of collaboration with the 
mainstream parties (either the PD or the government coalition). While Grillo’s 
Movement was supposed to capitalize on the European tide of Euroscepticism44, 
the stake for Salvini had a rather different European dimension. Indeed, the 
Lega Nord had been one of the parties involved by the Front National and the 
Dutch Freedom Party in discussions on forming a new group in the EP45. In the 
case of Berlusconi, the EP elections were seen as the possibility to solve party’s 
                                                 
43
 Note that in 2009, Beppe Grillo backed the election to the European Parliament of two 
independent candidates, Luigi De Magistris and Sonia Alfano, in the lists of Italia dei 
Valori (Italy of Values, IDV). Fabio Bordignon, Luigi Ceccarini, “Five Stars and a 
Cricket. Beppe Grillo Shakes Italian Politics”, South European Society and Politics, vol. 
18, n. 4, p. 430. For the 2014 online selection see Martina Castigliani, “Europee, pronta la 
lista dei 73 candidati M5S. Ecco chi sono i volti per Bruxelles”, Il fatto quotidiano, 4 
April 2014, available at: http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2014/04/04/europee-pronte-le-
liste-candidati-m5s-per-il-secondo-turno-hanno-votato-in-33500/939443/, last accessed 29 
September 2014. 
44
 The Five Star Movement was to team up with Nigel Farage’s UKIP in an attempt to 
“bring down Brussels” from within the EP. Bruno Waterfield, “Italy’s Beppe Grillo joins 
Nigel Farage's ‘people's army’”, The Telegraph, 12 June 2014, http://www.telegraph 
.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/10896432/Italys-Beppe-Grillo-joins-Nigel-Farages-
peoples-army.html, last accessed 20 September 2014. 
45
 The formation of a parliamentary group was described as strategically important not only 
to voice discontent with EU policies, but also to obtain extra funding, staffing and 
speaking time. In the aftermath of the May 2014 elections, the alliance between the 
United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and M5S succeeded in forging a 
parliamentary group with the support of a defector from France’s National Front (FN). 
The populist group led by the FN failed to register an official parliamentary group, due to 
the refusal to form alliances with parties like Golden Dawn in Greece, Jobbik in Hungary, 
or the Polish nationalist party (KNP). 
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internal crisis and allow Berlusconi to once again amaze his critics by 
overcoming initially dramatic poll results. Forza Italia’s campaign had to face 
the challenge of its leader’s ban from public office, as well as the limits due to 
Berlusconi’s judiciary obligations to do social work, though the sentence allowed 
Berlusconi to benefit from indirect publicity before and during the elections. 
The Eurozone crisis was supposed to play a very important role in Italy's 
2014 EP elections. European issues were visible in the campaign not only in 
discussions on avoiding the “Greek” path or the need for economic reforms, but 
also in a Eurosceptic key. Indeed, the M5S put together its traditional anti-
corruption appeals with anti-immigration stances and criticisms of Italy’s Euro 
membership. A similar view was encapsulated by the Lega Nord’s alliance with 
Geert Wilders’ appeal “to liberate our countries from the ‘monster’ that is 
Brussels”46. Within the alliance led by Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders, 
Matteo Salvini voiced in favor of a so-called “iron pact for a different Europe” 
that is “not based on servitude to the euro and banks, ready to let us die of 
immigration and unemployment”47. In line with the Lega Nord’s and M5S’s 
emphasis on stricter measures on immigration, or their criticisms of Brussels 
technocrats, the campaign experienced a notable turn towards more Eurosceptic 
stances, justified mainly on cultural grounds, though protectionist stances also 
emerged in the debates. In the ultimate analysis, the EU played a more explicit 
role in shaping parties' discourses on Europe, though regularly filtered by 
national strategies, with the primary objective of politicians and parties to 
remain in national government office. 
In sum, the campaign for the EP became a tribune with two main 
characters – Renzi and Grillo, each appealing to the image of homo novus, and 
the need for radical change – with various secondary actors in the background. 
The rhetoric of the two frontrunners was different in content and target 
audience. While Renzi and the Democratic Party put major emphasis on a 
message of hope, appealing to the PD’s core electoral base (pensioners, public 
employees), to the elderly, and more in general to those who intend to defend 
their current socio-economic position, Grillo’s M5S made wide use of fear, 
anger, and alarming tones of voice directed primarily to the younger generation 
and a large number of small business owners48. 
                                                 
46
 “Wilders-Le Pen Alliance: What Makes It, What Breaks it?”,Euractiv, 16 May 2014, 
available at: http://www.euractiv.com/sections/eu-elections-2014/wilders-le-pen-alliance-
what-makes-it-what-breaks-it-302155, last accessed 29 September 2014. 
47
 Mara Bizzotto, Karin Kadenbach, Giulio Carini, ”Populist Snapshots: Lega Nord (Italy)”, 
openDemocracy, 18 March 2014, available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-
europe-make-it/mara-bizzotto-karin-kadenbach-giulio-carini/populist-snapshots-lega-
nord-italy, last accessed 29 September 2014. 
48
 Roberto Orsi, “The European Elections in Italy May Be a Signal that Beppe Grillo’s 
Vision Is Simply Too Negative for Italians to Accept In the Long Term”, LSE Blog, 2014, 
available at: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2014/06/04/the-european-elections-in-italy-
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EU Elections in Italy: A Clear Winner 
 
Following the accession of Croatia, in 2013, the number of seats in the 
EP rose from 736 to 751; in the process of reallocation of EP seats, Italy 
obtained one supplementary seat (from 72 to 73). The allocation of the 73 seats 
is based on the adoption of a proportional representation system applied to five 
national electoral districts and a threshold set at 4%49. Beyond these technicalities, 
the results of the European election in Italy were certainly surprising. There was a 
decline in turnout compared with the previous EP elections (- 7,83% with 
respect to the 2009 EP elections – see Table 2), but also a lower turnout in 
European than national elections (-17.97% compared with the 2013 legislative 
elections)50. Still, the level of participation was higher than the EU average (+ 
14.68%). On the whole, until the 1989 EP elections, Italian voters had a rather 
high level of participation (an average of 83.06%). In parallel with the 
disintegration of the First Republic, Italy experienced a homogenization towards 
lower turnout levels. Still, Italy belongs to the group of countries with relatively 
high levels of turnout compared with the EU average, and the average turnout 
rate of the Central and Eastern European Member States (Figure 1). 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Turnout EU Elections in Italy (1979-2014)51 
                                                                                                                       
may-be-a-signal-that-beppe-grillos-vision-is-simply-too-negative-for-italians-to-accept-
in-the-long-term/, last accessed 29 September 2014. 
49
 The mechanism of transformation of votes into seats is based on the Hare quota method. 
For more details see Filippo Tronconi, Marco Valbruzzi, “Punizione o protesta? Il voto ai 
governi europei”, in Marco Valbruzzi, Rinaldo Vignati (eds.), L’Italia e l’Europa al bivio 
delle riforme...cit., pp. 15-23. 
50
 Idea voter turnout data for Italy, available at: http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm 
?CountryCode=IT, last accessed 29 September 2014. 
51
 European Parliament Official Data, available at: http://www.resultselections2014.eu/en/ 
turnout.html, last accessed 29 September 2014. 
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The key result is that the main governing party won more votes than the 
main opposition party, the M5S52. Grillo’s M5S was the largest political party in 
the 2013 EU elections and was supposed benefit from its status of opposition 
party. However, while the PD obtained 40.8% of the votes, the M5S gathered 
only 21.2%, and a weakened Forza Italia 16.8%. Within these results, the Lega 
Nord’s 6.2% reflects a successful strategy of recovery after a series of 
corruption scandals. 
 
Table 2 
Results of the 2014 EP Elections in Italy53 
 
Party EP Group Votes (%) Seats 
Seats (change from 
2009)54 
Democratic Party S&D 40.81 31 +10 
Five Star Movement EFDD 21.15 17 n.a 
Forza Italia EPP 16.81 13 -16 
Lega Nord NI 6.15 5 -4 
New Center Right –Union of the 
Center 
EPP 4.38 6 
- 
The Other Europe GUE/NGL 4.03 6 +4 
 
The Italian results are in sharp opposition to those Europe-wide, where 
the parties of the prime-ministers got fewer votes than in the previous national 
election55. The data from Table 2 support the theory that European elections 
held shortly after a national election tend to favor the party in government. The 
PD’s success reflects a still active “honeymoon period” between the party in 
government and the electorate56. The party leading the government coalition 
                                                 
52
 Note that according to Hix and Marsh, “On average, governments in European Parliament 
elections were 7.5 per cent down on their vote share in the previous national election. 
Moreover, government losses were greater the further into the national election cycle the 
European Parliament elections were held”. “Second-Order Effects Plus Pan-European 
Political Swings…cit.”, p. 6. 
53
 Based on European Parliament official data, available at: http://www.results-
elections2014.eu/en/election-results-2014.html, last accessed 29 September 2014. 
54
 The compared results in seats obtained by the main political parties in the 2014 EP are 
rough computations considering that there have been numerous changes in the 
composition of the electoral lists. For example, the NDC was previously part of the PDL 
(together with the current Forza Italia). New political actors entered the political scene, 
among which the M5S but also the NCD. 
55
 Filippo Tronconi, Marco Valbruzzi, “Punizione o protesta?...cit.”,p. 18-20. 
56
 D’Alimonte observes that the loyalty rate of PDs electorate in these elections is 
particularly high, almost all of those who voted for PD in 2013 voted for it again in 2014. 
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increased its votes with respect not only to the 2009 EP elections, but also to the 
2013 national elections57. The correlated result is that the PD has become the 
main party in terms of seats within the S&D group (the Italian delegation 
constitutes 31 seats of 191, 4 more than the traditionally stronger SPD 
delegation). In a wider EU perspective, Tronconi and Valbruzzi58 observe that 
the parties in government for less than 180 days (which is Renzi’s case) tend to 
reinforce their vote shares, though with several caveats. While positive results 
were registered in the case of Latvia’s new coalition government, headed by 
former Minister of Agriculture Laimdota Straujuma, Manuel Valls’ government 
faced a strong defeat, in line with the victory of the Front National. 
Based on data from Table 2, the PD’s success is undisputable, but the 
range of the party’s success is even wider if we consider that since the first EP 
elections, held in 1979, the PD is the Italian political party that has obtained the 
highest share of votes ever recorded59. The PD’s electoral success is also 
supported by a rather homogenous territorial coverage, though there were 
visible electoral feuds in central Italy, in particular in the region of Tuscany 
(56.4%). As noted by Maggini, the PD was the first political party also in the 
northeastern regions, an area formerly controlled by the Christian Democrats in 
the First Republic, and thereafter by Forza Italia and the Lega Nord. In a similar 
vein, the M5S had greater success in the southern regions; compared with the 
2013 general elections, the Movement lost a high number of votes in the 
northwestern regions60. Note that Forza Italia also registered its best 
performances in the southern areas61. As observed by Pasquino and Valbruzzi, 
the geographic distribution of the vote indicates that the PD led by Renzi 
overcame all the traditional weaknesses of its forebears, the Christian 
Democrats and the Communist Party, by gaining a homogeneous national 
distribution of voting: “The PD was first in all Italian regions, and in 107 of 110 
provinces. It achieved good results even in areas of the north (both the 
northwest and the northeast), which have been hostile and almost impenetrable 
since 1994”62. 
                                                                                                                       
This successful mobilization is credited first of all to M. Renzi’s capacity to bring PD 
voters and new ones to the polls. Roberto D’Alimonte, “High Fidelity and New Votes for 
Renzi”, in Lorenzo De Sio, Vincenzo Emanuele and Nicola Maggini (eds.), The European 
Parliament Elections of 2014, cit., pp. 99-100. 
57
 Still, this increase has to be contextualized, in view of the rather low turnout. 
58
 Roberto D’Alimonte, “High Fidelity and New Votes for Renzi”, cit., p. 20. 
59
 Nicola Maggini, “Electoral Results: The PD from the ‘Majoritarian Vocation’ to Its 
Realization”, in Lorenzo De Sio, Vincenzo Emanuele and Nicola Maggini (eds.), The 
European Parliament Elections of 2014, cit., pp. 89-90. 
60
 Ibidem. 
61
 Ibidem. 
62
 Gianfranco Pasquino, Marco Valbruzzi, “Il Partito democratico...cit.”, p. 121. 
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Though according to the standard theory that large parties, whether in 
government or opposition, tend to lose votes to smaller parties, the 2014 EP 
elections in Italy confirmed the electoral appeal of large parties. The M5S sent 
the second largest Italian delegation to the EP. The M5S’s 17 MPs became 
highly appealing, in particular for those parties aiming to maintain/create 
parliamentary groups. Grillo decided to leave the decision to an online 
platform63, and eventually chose the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy 
group (EFDD) led by the UKIP leader Nigel Farage. The Lega Nord’s results 
were its worst since the 1994 EP elections, losing almost half of its MEPs64. 
Still, on the whole, the new leadership succeeded in surpassing the 4% 
threshold, with sizable increases in the central and southern regions65, and the 
Lega Nord’s results were considered a sign of recovery after a steady decline66. 
Still, the Lega Nord’s involvement in the populist alliance fronted by Marine Le 
Pen and Geert Wilders was less successful, considering the failure to gather 
members from at least seven EU member states. 
 
 
ITALY, PARTY POLITICS AND THE EU:  
CONCLUSIVE REMARKS 
 
The principal conclusion based on analysis from the above is that despite 
the persistent economic crisis and weak political equilibria, the 2014 EP 
elections were not used by Italian voters to punish governments. Held shortly 
after the new Renzi cabinet was sworn in, the outstanding results of the leading 
party of the government coalition confirmed the standard interpretations on the 
effect of the timing of the European elections in relation to the national electoral 
cycle. The Renzi-led PD proved to still be in a “honeymoon“ period with the 
Italian voters. Though the turnout was lower (with respect to both the 2009 EP 
elections and the most recent national elections), the governing party received 
2.500.000 votes. As D’Alimonte’s analysis illustrates, behind these figures there 
was first the high level of loyalty among voters, who cast their preference for 
the PD in both the 2013 national elections and in 2014. The electoral behavior 
stressed that the main reason for Renzi’s success was his ability to bring PD 
                                                 
63
 The results of the online procedure were: 23.192 votes in favor out of 29.584 total votes 
(3.533 votes were cast in favor of the status of non-attached members, and 2.939 for 
joining the European Conservatives and Reformists. 
64
 Note that in the 2009 EP elections, the Lega achieved its highest national result ever  
slightly higher than the 1996 national elections results  with 10.2% (9 seats). 
65
 Nicola Maggini, “Electoral Results…cit.”, p. 97. 
66
 In the 2013 legislative elections, the Lega obtained 4.1% of the votes in the Chamber and 
4.3% in the Senate (0.5% less than the 8.3% in the 2008 national elections. 
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voters to the polls67. There were also important percentages of voters who 
switched their support to the leading government party. Considering the stake of 
credibility of the new government, the PD and its prime-minister were highly 
motivated to try to influence other voters as well. The voting shifts to the PD 
came from almost all the other parties in the elections, though to different 
degrees. The most significant shift of preference came from former prime-
minister Mario Monti’s Civic Choice68, and to lesser degrees from M5S, Forza 
Italia, and even Lega Nord voters. 
Overall, then, though EU institutional equilibrium has undergone major 
changes since the first European Parliament elections, in 1979 (in primis the 
notable increase in the power of the European Parliament), and EU issues have 
been more relevant in national political debates, the Italian case seems to 
demonstrate that the primary motivation of both politicians and voters is to 
position themselves in relation to the national government. As an indicator, 
electoral campaigns did focus on EU issues and policies, but almost 
compulsorily through the lenses of the performance of the national government. 
Hence the debates had little to do with EU politics, and more with the 
jurisdiction of the EU institutions in relation to sensitive national issues such as 
management of the financial and sovereign debt crisis. Furthermore, 
considering that electoral participation is generally seen as an indicator of 
democratic functioning, the empirical evidence confirms that fewer citizens 
participated in the 2014 European Elections in Italy, and among those who did 
participate important vote switching was identified. The classic explanation 
seems to be valid in this case also: Italian voters were less motivated to turn out 
because of the prevalent perception that the stakes were lower. This perception 
was fed by the supply side (party, politicians and media). From a strictly 
rational perspective, it can be said that considering the costs for both sides (in 
time, resources, and mobilization for parties or in voting for the citizens), the 
expected returns were definitely lower in these European elections. 
The “party size” variable per se mattered less given that, with the 
exception of the PD, both small and large parties lost part of their voters 
compared with the previous national elections. As in the rest of Europe, anti-EU 
parties did still better than average in a campaign in which issues such as 
immigration and the economic crisis were regularly present. This analysis on 
                                                 
67
 Roberto D’Alimonte, “High Fidelity and New Votes for Renzi”, cit., p. 100. More 
specifically, in the city where Renzi used to be mayor before being sworn in to 
government, the PD gained the votes of 95% of its previous electorate. The lowest loyalty 
rate among the PD voters was registered in the south, in Palermo, though it was still above 
70%. For the same cities, D’Alimonte observed that 38% of those who voted for the M5S 
in 2013 did not vote for it again in Florence during the EP elections and 45% in Palermo 
did not. 
68
 Data on vote shifts from Roberto D’Alimonte, “High Fidelity and New Votes for Renzi”, 
cit., p. 100. 
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European Parliament elections in Italy seems to support the classic view that 
these elections were primarily national contests rather than European ones, 
considering that national issues – e.g., the legitimacy of the newly born Renzi 
cabinet ‒ rather than European issues shaped both politicians’ and voter’s behavior. 
Nevertheless, there is some evidence to suggest that positions towards the EU 
influenced Eurosceptic parties, both the Lega Nord and the M5S. If the issue of 
the EU’s legitimacy remains a problem, the 2014 European elections were a 
suitable instrument for solving the deficit of legitimacy of the incumbent cabinet. 
Based on the above, the Italian case provides evidence of a “national 
stake with a European twist”: the stability of the incumbent government in view 
of Italy’s presidency of the Council of the European Union. As in the past, the 
national dimension prevailed, given that in the end, though not directly, the 
Italian vote in the 2014 European elections was a distinctly “Italian Affair”: an 
ideal window of opportunity to register endorsement of the incumbent 
government. 
